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Review Note 
Reliability assessment of mechanical systems 
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J D Andrews, BSc, PhD, CEng, MIMechE, AFIMA, MSaRS, FSS 
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Loughborough University of Technology, Loughborough, Leicestershire 
The assessment of mechanical systems is not an exact science and predictions can be subject to considerable uncertainty. In this paper 
the particular problems of mechanical system reliability assessment are discussed and a general methodology presented based on 
experience from availability studies carried out on offshore and onshore process plant. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Reliability and risk assessment techniques are the 
methods advocated by many regulatory bodies to assess 
the safety of modern, complex process plant and their 
protective systems. However, reliability assessment can 
also be applied to determine the likely availability char- 
acteristics of equipment. The trend in manufacturing 
systems towards large, single-stream plant means that 
outages due to equipment failures and their subsequent 
repair can have a significant effect on profitability. Reli- 
ability assessment, particularly during the design phase, 
can be applied to identify the systems, equipment and 
components that are likely to have a major impact on 
product availability-this can, of course, include acci- 
dents that destroy equipment or part of the plant. 
Attention to these reliability-critical areas by the 
introduction of redundancy and attention to maintain- 
ability during the design phase of new plant can lead to 
dramatic improvements in profitability during the plant 
lifetime. The methods can also be applied to existing 
plant, although generally with less dramatic effect since 
the basic plant design is less easily modified. 
Predicting the reliability of mechanical systems does 
pose special problems. Here these problems are dis- 
cussed and a basic procedure for carrying our reli- 
ability, availability and maintainability assessments is 
described based on experience from offshore and 
onshore process plant studies. 
2 MECHANICAL RELIABILITY 
Models currently employed to predict failure in mecha- 
nical process plant are quite elementary. They are 
largely based on techniques developed many years ago 
for electronic systems and components. These models 
can be employed effectively for the evaluation of mecha- 
nical systems, but they must be used with caution since 
they assume that extrinsic factors such as the frequency 
of random shocks to the system (for example power 
surges) determine the probability of failure-hence their 
assumption of Poisson processes and constant hazard 
rates. 
These assumptions are frequently not valid for 
mechanical equipment. Carter (1) shows that intrinsic 
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degradation mechanisms such as fatigue, creep and 
stress corrosion can have a strong influence on system 
lifetime and the probability of failure. In highly stressed 
equipment cumulative damage to specific components 
will be the most likely cause of failure. Hence a review 
of the factors that influence degradation mechanisms 
such as maintenance practice and operating environ- 
ments becomes a vital element in the evaluation of 
likely reliability performance. To predict the probability 
of a high-speed rotating machine failure it will be neces- 
sary to identify the various degradation mechanisms 
and to assess the impact of different maintenance and 
operating strategies on the expected lifetimes and main- 
tainability of the different components in the system. 
The load spectrum generated by different operating 
and maintenance scenarios can have a significant effect 
on system failure probability. Carter’s research has been 
published in a number of papers and is summarized in 
his book, Mechanical Reliability (1). Essentially his 
work related failure probability to the effect of the inter- 
action between the system’s load and strength distribu- 
tions (Fig. 1). When these distributions are well 
separated with small variances (as they are with new 
equipment in low-stress conditions) the safety margin 
will be large and the failure distribution will tend 
towards the constant hazard-rate (random-shock) 
model. In this case the system failure probability can be 
computed as a function of the hazard rates for all the 
components in the system. For highly stressed 
equipment operating in hostile environments or sub- 
jected to fast transients during start-up, the load and 
strength distributions may have a significant overlap 
because of the greater variance of the load distribution 
and the deterioration in component strength with time. 
Carter shows that the safety margin will then be smaller 
and the tendency will be towards a weakest-link model. 
The probability of failure in this case can then depend 
on the resistance of one specific component (the weakest 
link) in the system to the applied load excursions. 
In between these two extremes the model becomes 
more complex, incorporating aspects of the random- 
shock and weakest-link models. An alternative model 
was proposed by Moss (2) in 1987. This model has been 
further developed at Manchester University (3) for the 
on-line prediction of failure probability for a wet-gas 
compressor. In this development a reliability assessment 
of the compressor system was first performed using the 
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Fig. 1 Interaction of load and strength distributions 
constant hazard-rate model and the system failure prob- 
ability predicted using generic reliability data. Changes 
in the monitored load-parameter distributions (which 
are assumed to reflect component strength changes) 
were then input to the model to continuously update 
the prediction of the system residual lifetime. 
Catuneanu and Milhalache (4) have also considered 
mechanical system reliability and have proposed a 
Markov chain model for systems subject to age- 
dependent failures which may recover to the initial state 
or to a degraded state. They propose the use of fault 
tree analysis to identify the minimum cut sets leading to 
failure and simulation to determine the lifetime distribu- 
tion as a function of age. The component reliabilities 
are related to the real stresses by an approach similar to 
that of Carter. These models of mechanical reliability 
are interesting from a theoretical point of view but no 
detailed examples or actual applications are given in the 
text. 
Bloch and Geitner (5) describe more practical 
methods for assessing machine reliability based on the 
age of the equipment, the environment and the duty 
cycle. The procedures are well defined and examples, 
with comprehensive check-lists to be applied in associ- 
ation with failure mode and effect analysis, are given for 
a wide range of equipment. In the United Kingdom 
similar methods have been applied with some success 
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for the prediction of safety-critical failures in large 
reciprocating pumps by Lewis and Carrick (6). Martin 
(7) and Hughes (8) have both proposed methods for 
modelling dependent failures, the former adapting 
Carter's approach to predict potential failures for a 
gearbox and the latter considering the effect of different 
environments (including the maintenance environment) 
on the probability of simultaneous failure in 
redundancy systems. 
In all of the foregoing studies, however, the lack of 
comprehensive data on equipment failures and load dis- 
tributions can be identified as the main limitation of 
these models for mechanical system reliability assess- 
ment. Thus for large mechanical plant an approach 
based on the assumption of constant hazard and repair 
rates in conjunction with sensitivity analysis appears to 
be the best currently available to identify the reliability- 
critical items. Subsequently, checks on the effect of oper- 
ating and maintenance policy can then be carried out 
during the design review stage to evaluate their likely 
impact on degradation processes, failure frequencies 
and repair/replacement times. 
3 RELIABILITY PREDICTION 
3.1 General 
With mechanical systems and particularly those con- 
taining rotating machinery, the prediction of reliability 
performance is not straightforward. There can be con- 
siderable variance in the failure frequencies and average 
repair times of components which are not revealed by 
conventional methods of reliability analysis. Although 
the basic reliability analysis techniques such as failure 
mode and effect analysis and fault trees can be applied 
in mechanical system assessments, there is a need to 
consider and limit the effects of component degradation. 
Operational, environmental and maintenance condi- 
tions which may affect the validity of the generic 
reliability/maintainability data used in assessing 
equipment and system availability also need to be 
studied. A subjective evaluation of the factors which can 
lead to uncertainties in the basic data is necessary to 
ensure that predictions based on the assumption of con- 
stant hazard rates are sound. Design decisions can then 
be taken with a reasonable degree of confidence. 
Reliability is generally defined as the probability that 
a system, equipment or component will operate suc- 
cessfully for a stated period of time under stated oper- 
ating and environmental conditions. In this definition 
reliability is employed as a generic term covering unre- 
pairable and repairable systems. For plant where the 
systems are repairable, the repair process as well as the 
failure process needs consideration. It is usual (because 
of the relative limitations of the failure/repair data 
available) to consider steady state operation when the 
plant is assumed to have settled down and thus failure 
time and repair time are random variables. For this 
steady state model the availability, A, the probability to 
function on demand, is also a random variable and is 
defined as the ratio of the uptime to the total time. 
Hence 
A =  
MTTF 
MTTF + MTTR 
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where 
MTTF = mean time to failure 
MTTR = mean time to repair 
With this simple expression it is possible to calculate 
global estimates of the availabilities of equipments and 
to combine these logically to determine the expected 
availability of a system. 
This expression is satisfactory when the plant can 
only operate in two states: up (working) or down (not 
working). Where the plant can operate at different levels 
of output the availabilities in the different operational 
states must be determined. The output availability of 
the plant is then the sum of each operating state avail- 
ability multiplied by the product output level for that 
state. For a plant with n up (output) states and one 
down state the product availability would be: 
Product " 
availability i= 
= 1 (availability i x level i output) 
For example, if an offshore production platform can 
exist in either one of two output states producing 
100000 or 50000 barrels of oil per day with avail- 
abilities of 78 and 18 per cent respectively (and down- 
time unavailability of 4 per cent), then the average 
output availability of the platform is 
0.78 x 100000 + 0.18 x 50000 
100 000 
= 87% A(0utput) = 
(that is an average production rate of 87000 barrels of 
oil per day). 
4 PROCEDURE FOR ASSESSMENT 
For the reliability assessment of complex systems a con- 
sistent, logical approach is essential. The plant specifi- 
cation, engineering drawings, process diagrams and 
other documentation alone can make a paper mountain 
several feet high, so that isolating the basic information 
needed to carry out the assessment can present quite a 
problem. For most process plant an effective approach 
can usually be made by concentrating on the piping and 
instrumentation diagrams (PIDs). Using these drawings 
with the plant specification and process flow diagrams 
as the initial information base the assessment can 
proceed along the following lines: 
1. Review the information available and write down a 
brief description of the process. 
2. Define: 
(a) assessment objectives, 
(b) plant and system boundaries, 
(c) inputs and outputs across boundaries, 
(d) plant operational states, 
(e) failure criteria, 
(f) assumption made in the availability model. 
3. Develop a simplified functional block diagram for 
the installation and logic diagrams such as fault 
trees for each output state down to a system/ 
subsystem level (the indenture level) at which rele- 
vant failure and repair data can be obtained. 
4. From the fault trees and output-state information, 
develop an availability model for the installation 
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and check generic sources of failure, repair and pro- 
duction data for input to the model. 
5. Assemble a set of PIDs for the systems, draw in 
subsystem boundaries and evaluate subsystem 
availabilities. Where relevant data are not available 
use failure mode and effect analysis or parts count 
techniques. 
6. Review these data against the operating states and 
failure criteria, adjust for the plant operational/ 
environmental conditions and insert into the avail- 
ability model equations. Estimate the availabilities 
of the systems and plant and compute the average 
output availability of the installation. 
7. Rank the systems and subsystems by their avail- 
ability scores. 
8. Carry out a sensitivity analysis for the low- 
availability items to determine the effect of changes 
in the input data on the predictions. Where the 
changes are significant review the data sources and 
recalculate the availabilities with the modified data. 
9. Consider the effects of degradation mechanisms 
induced by design, operation and maintenance 
procedures/environments on component lifetimes, 
system failure frequencies and repair times at the 
design review stage. Recommend QA (quality 
assurance) procedures (including condition 
monitoring) or design modifications to control their 
effects. 
10. Write a report highlighting the reliability-critical 
areas with recommendations on design, main- 
tenance and operation relevant to availability per- 
formance. 
The methods are described in more detail elsewhere, 
for example by Andrews and Moss (9,lO) and Davidson 
and Hunsley (11). Here the application of the two main 
techniques-failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) 
and fault tree analysis (FTA)--employed in mechanical 
system reliability studies are discussed with examples 
from actual assessments. 
5 ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES 
5.1 FMEA 
Failure mode and effect analysis is a powerful reliability 
assessment technique developed by the American 
defence industry in the 1960s to address the problems 
experienced with complex electronic, weapon-control 
systems. Subsequently it was extended for use with 
other electronic, electrical and mechanical equipment. It 
is a step-by-step procedure for the systematic evaluation 
of the failure effects and criticality of potential failure 
modes in an equipment design. FMEA can be applied 
at different indenture levels, for example to determine 
the availability characteristics of a gas compressor oper- 
ating on an offshore oil production platform or the 
failure-on-demand probability of its fire protection 
system, down to an evaluation of the failure mecha- 
nisms associated with a pressure switch. By the analysis 
of individual component failure modes, the effect of 
each failure on system operation can be determined. 
FMEAs can be performed in a variety of different 
ways depending on the objective of the assessment, the 
stage of equipment development and the information 
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Function 
1.4.0 Lubrication 
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oil at pressure to 
bearings and 
gearing. 
Auxilliary oil pump 
from starting, Jet 
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FAILURE 
Mode 
Leakage 
Oil too hot 
Oil pressure 
low 
Oil 
contaminated 
Oil level in 
sump low 
Oil level in 
sump high 
POSSIBLE 
C A U S E  
Loose connectors. 
Auxiliary oil pump 
fault. 
Restriction of oil 
flow. Rest tictioii 
of water cnoling. 
Fouling of heat 
exchanger. 
Riockage. Wear. 
Jet pump faults. 
Filter not cleaning 
oil. Water in oil. 
System leak. Oil 
transfer to 
refrigerant circuit. 
Refrigerant in oil. 
SYMPTOM 
DETECTED 
BY 
Obsewation - 
gas in air 
monitors. Fall 
of sump level. 
High oil 
temperature 
warning. 
Low o i l  
pressrre 
warning. 
Daily 
observation of 
oil condition. 
Observed in 
sight glass. 
Observed in 
sight glass. 
Foaming. 
Local 
Slow leaks have no 
effect. 
Inadequate lubrication 
due to law oil Viscosity 
and loss of bearing 
cooling. 
Inadequate lubrication 
due to reduction of oil 
flow. 
Dismlouration and/or 
emulsification of oil. 
Only sudden severe 
leak would have ellect. 
Reduced lubrication 
due to  gas separating 
out from oil. 
On next level 
Eventual shutdown if 
unconected by loss of 
oil pressure. 
Performance loss if air 
ingress. 
Eventual shutdown 
Eventual shutdown. 
Eventual damage if not 
corrected. 
Sudden, severe leak 
would lead to shutdown 
on low lube oil pressure. 
Eventually no out UI 
Shutdown or low kbe 
oil pressure. 
Fig. 2 Functional FMEA worksheet 
Compensating 
provision against 
failure 
2-ho~rly 
inspedions. 
Automatic 
shutdown on low 
oil pressure. 
Unit shutdown 
due to high lube 
oil temperature. 
Unit shutdown 
due to low lube 
oil pressure. 
Pilimdition is 
ud ed daily. Oil 
IS c anged 
 daily 
checks. Sudden 
severe leak gives 
shutdown or law 
oil pressure. 
 daily daily 
checks. P n s t a r t  
requirement to 
keep oil hot for 
12 hours. 
annually. 
REMARKS 
Sump contains M litres. so I loss 
of sa 2S% acceptable to  unit, 
s h o d  be readily observed. 
Slow rise of oil temperature 
would be found by study of 
readings. 
Oil pressure is one of the most 
important parameten 
monitored. Will be watched to 
decide on state of oil Wter. 
Condition of 'replaced" dl filters 
is examined for evidence of an 
abnormal state. 
Oil can be topped up, a standard 
routine. When sufliaent oil h u  
migrated to  refrigerant it can be 
returned slowly. 
Gas separating out from oil 
would give low lubricating oil 
pressure shutdown. 
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available on its components at the time of the analysis. 
The objective of the FMEA must be clear-whether to 
identify, say, weak areas in the design, the safety-critical 
components or perhaps maintainability-critical items. 
The FMEA focus may dictate a different worksheet 
format in each case; nevertheless, there are two basic 
approaches: 
1. The functional FMEA, which recognizes that each 
item is designed to perform a number of functions 
which can be classified as outputs. These outputs are 
identified.and loss of essential inputs to the item or 
internal failures are then evaluated with respect to 
their effects on system operation. 
2. The hardware FMEA, which sequentially lists indi- 
vidual equipment items and analyses the effect of 
each item failure mode on the operation of the 
system. 
In many cases a combination of these two approaches is 
employed. For example, a functional analysis at plant 
and major system levels, followed by more detailed 
analysis of the hardware shown to be sensitive to the 
range of uncertainties in the failure data is employed in 
the initial functional, ‘broad-brush’ analysis. 
The FMEA worksheet is tabular in format to foster a 
systematic approach to the analysis. A standard work- 
sheet layout is shown in Fig. 2. The column headings 
generally employed are : 
Item identity/description : a unique identification 
code and description of each item 
Function: a brief description of the function per- 
formed by the item 
Failure mode: each item failure mode is listed 
separately-there may be several for an item 
Possible causes : the likely causes of each postulated 
failure mode 
Failure detection method: features of the design 
through which the failure is recognized 
Failure effect-local level: the effect of the failure on 
the item’s function 
Failure effect-system level: the effect of the item 
failure mode on system operation 
Compensating provisions : any internal compensating 
provisions which could mitigate the effect of the 
failure 
Remarks: comments on the failure mode/effect 
including any recommendation for action 
If the analysis is extended to quantify the severity and 
probability of failure (or failure rate) of the system 
(defined as a failure mode and effect criticality 
analysis-FMECA) further columns may be added to 
the worksheet, such as: 
Severity: the level of severity of the effect ascribed to 
each failure mode classified as : 
Level 1-minor, no effect on item functional per- 
formance 
Level 2-major, degradation of item functional 
performance 
Level 3-critica1, severe reduction of item func- 
tional performance resulting in a change in the 
system operational state 
Level katastrophic ,  complete loss of system 
function 
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Loss frequency : the expected frequency of loss 
resulting from each failure mode, either as a failure 
rate or failure probability. The latter is usually esti- 
mated for the operating time interval as a propor- 
tion of the overall system failure rate or failure 
probability (F) .  The levels generally employed for 
process plant are: 
(a) Very low probability <0.01F 
(c) Medium probability 0.1-0.2F 
(d) High probability > 0.2F 
(b) Low probability 0.01-0.1F 
Part failure rate I , :  the overall failure rate of the 
equipment or part in its operational mode and 
environment. Where appropriate, application and 
environmental factors may be applied to the 
generic data to adjust for the difference between the 
conditions associated with the generic failure rate 
data and the operating stresses under which the 
item is going to be used. 
Failure mode proportion a:  the fraction of the overall 
failure rate related to the failure mode under con- 
sideration 
Probability of failure effect p:  the conditional prob- 
ability that the failure effect occurs. 
Operational failure rate ,lo : the product of A,, a and 
Data source: the source of the failure rate (or failure 
A one-sheet example from an FMECA is shown in Fig. 
3. 
For FMECAs a criticality matrix similar to the one 
shown in Fig. 4 is constructed relating loss frequency to 
severity for each failure mode. Failure mode identifica- 
tion numbers are entered in the appropriate cell of the 
matrix according to their loss frequency and severity. 
The critical item failure modes which may require fur- 
ther study are shown in the top, right-hand cells. 
FMEA worksheets are frequently developed for very 
specific applications, for example to provide input to an 
RCM (reliability centred maintenance) analysis or a 
plant availability study. One sheet of a simplified func- 
tional FMEA for the availability assessment of the 
separator module of an offshore plant is shown in Fig. 
5. Here consideration of the failure modes has been 
restricted to the proportion that can cause a forced 
outage of the system. Average repair times are included 
and combined with the aggregated failure rate to esti- 
mate the availability of this subsystem. 
B 
probability) data 
5.2 Fault tree analysis 
There are two approaches that can be used to analyse 
the causal relationships between component failures 
and system failure. These are inductive or forward 
analysis and deductive or backward analysis. FMEA is 
an example of inductive analysis. As seen from the pre- 
vious section, it starts with a set of component failure 
conditions and proceeds forward, identifying the pos- 
sible consequences; this is a ‘what happens if‘ approach. 
Fault tree analysis is a deductive ‘what can cause this’ 
approach and is used to identify the causal relationships 
leading to a specific system failure mode-the ‘top 
event’. 
The fault tree is developed from this top, unwanted 
event, in branches showing the different event paths. 
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I I I 
4 
Loss 
frequency 3 
(failure rate 
or probability) 
2 
1 2 3 4 
Severity 
Fig. 4 Criticality matrix 
Component failure events represented in the tree are 
progressively redefined in terms of lower-resolution 
events until the basic events on which good-quality 
failure data are available are encountered. The events 
are combined logically by use of gate symbols as shown 
in Fig. 6, which shows the structure of a fault tree. In 
this case the basic event combinations that could result 
in total loss of output from a simple cooling water 
system are developed. Using this failure logic diagram 
the probability of the top event or the top event fre- 
quency can then be calculated by providing information 
on the basic event probabilities. 
The top event and the system boundary must be 
chosen with care so that the analysis is not too broad or 
too narrow to produce the results required. The specifi- 
cation of the system boundary is particularly important 
to the success of the analysis. Many systems have exter- 
nal power supplies and other services such as a water 
supply. It would not be practical to trace all possible 
causes of failure of these services back through the dis- 
tribution and generation systems; nor would this extra 
detail provide any useful information concerning the 
system being assessed. The location of the external 
boundary will be partially decided by the aspect of 
system performance that is of interest; however, it is 
also important to define the external boundary in the 
time domain. For example, the start-up or shut-down 
conditions of a plant can generate different hazards 
from its steady state operation and it may be necessary 
to account for this in tracing the fault. 
Within the assessment procedure described pre- 
viously the detailed steps required to perform a fault 
tree analysis can be summarized as : 
1. Identification of system failure states for analysis 
2. System understanding 
3. Logic model generation 
4. Qualitative evaluation of the logic model 
5. Data analysis 
6. Quantitative evaluation of the logic model 
7. Uncertainty analysis 
8. Sensitivity/importance analysis 
Many of these steps are the same whatever system is 
being analysed, though there are some aspects which 
mean that special attention must be devoted to the dif- 
ferent stages when mechanical systems are involved. 
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Having performed steps 1 to 4 and carried out a qualit- 
ative evaluation of the fault tree, the minimal cut sets 
(combinations of component failures which provide the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for system failure) 
are produced. 
To progress further with the analysis requires the 
component failure probabilities, q(t), to be determined. 
Typical models utilized in commercial fault tree evalu- 
ation codes would be as follows : 
I (1 - e-'"+''t) 4(t) = -I + V  
for revealed failures where I is the component failure 
rate and v the repair rate and 
for unrevealed failures, where qAV is the average 
unavailability, z is the mean time to repair and 8 is the 
test interval. For safety systems that are normally inac- 
tive, failures are only revealed during test, which means 
that the unrevealed failure model is appropriate for 
these systems. However, the underlying assumption in 
both of these models is that the failure and repair rates 
are constant, giving a negative exponential distribution 
for the probability of failure (repair) prior to any time t. 
Constant failure rates are associated with random 
failure events as indicated by the useful life period of the 
'bathtub curve'. Mechanical components subject to 
wear, corrosion, fatigue, etc., may in many cases not 
conform to this assumption. If the quality of data avail- 
able permits a statistical distribution to be fitted to the 
failure times then other distributions such as the 
Weibull may provide a more accurate description of the 
data. This is also true for the repair times which can 
commonly be described by normal or log-normal dis- 
tributions. 
When either the failure or repair rates are not con- 
stant and probability density functions for the times to 
failure At) and repair g(t) are available, then they can be 
combined to give the unconditional failure intensity w( t )  
and unconditional repair intensity u(t) by solving the 
following simultaneous integral equations [see reference 
( 9 ~ :  
w(t )  =f(t) + [ ' f ( t  - u)u(u) du 
JO 
(3) 
PI 
~ ( t )  = g(t  - U)W(U)  du Jo 
Having solved these the component unavailability is 
then given by 
(4) 
For the case, of constant failure rates f ( t )  = & A t  and 
g(t) = v,"', equations (3) can be solved by Laplace 
transforms. Substituting the solution obtained into 
equation (4) yields equation (1). For more complex dis- 
tributions of failure and repair times, numerical solu- 
tions may be required. 
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' PLATFORM - GEORDIEALPHA 9 
0 SUB-SYSTEM - 1ST STAGE SEPARATOR f 
IDENTITY 
V210A 
xEA2 
LEA4 
FCV3 
DESCRIITION 
Separator vessel 
ESD valve (12" ball 
valve, pneumatic 
actuator) 
Pressure transmitter 
Oil Oow control valve 
(6" globe valve, 
pneumatic actuator) 
FAILURE MODE 
~~ ~ ~~~ 
Internal mechanical 
failure 
a) Valve stuck open 
b) Valve stuck shut 
c) Actuator failure 
Fails to 'Alarm' state 
a) Valve stuck open 
SYSTEM - OILPROCESS 
DRAWING(S) - P & ID 005 Sheet 1 of 4 
FAlLURE EFFECTS 
Liquid level out of 
control, level alarms 
initiate ESD, inlet 
valve XEA2 closes. 
Process shutdown. 
a) No eITed while 
running. Alarm on 
shutdown. Restart 
inhibited. 
b) Start up inhibited 
(25%) 
c) Valve closes (fail- 
safe). Process 
shutdown (50%). 
ESD valve XEA2 
closes Process 
shutdown. 
a) No efiect, but 
LEA11 will initiate 
process shutdown if no 
action taken. 
FORCEDOUTAGE 
FAIL RATE (FIYR) 
0.12 
0.26 
0.35 
0.26 
REST0 RATION 
TIME (HRS) 
24 
8 
2 
8 
2.88 
1.56 
0.7 
2.08 
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With the components data produced at  step 5 the 
fault tree quantification can produce: 
(a) the system failure probability, 
(b) the system failure rate and 
(c) the expected number of system failures. 
Where failure and repair distributions have been speci- 
fied for the analysis, confidence intervals can be deter- 
mined at step 7. Step 8 produces the importance 
rankings for the basic event which identifies the com- 
ponents that provide the most significant contribution 
to system failure. 
Fault trees are, of course, significantly more complex 
for real engineering systems than that illustrated in Fig. 
6. Figure 7 shows part of a fault tree developed to rep- 
resent the failure of a ventilation recirculation control 
system in an under-sea mine. For this analysis it was 
required that ventilation recirculation was stopped in 
certain 'unsafe' conditions such as when carbon mon- 
oxide or methane was detected in the mine. Certain 
components in this study were shown to have failure 
times that were represented by the Weibull distribution 
and an accurate analysis would therefore require the 
solution of equations (3). 
The main use of fault trees is in safety and risk 
studies. Fault trees provide a useful representation of 
the different failure paths which can lead to unavail- 
ability of systems and plant even without considering 
failure and repair data-which may provide some ditli- 
culties. In many cases, therefore, fault trees and failure 
mode and effect analysis will be employed in 
combination-the FMEA to define the consequences of 
specific equipment failures and the fault tree (or possibly 
several fault trees) to identify and quantify the paths 
that lead to plant unavailability. 
6 SIMULATION 
An alternative approach to system assessment, which 
requires no simplifying assumptions to be made regard- 
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ing independence of failure and repair events or the 
form of the distributions, is simulation. It is a computer 
intensive approach which is now becoming more 
popular due to the continuous advances being made in 
computer technology. This has resulted in the pro- 
cessing power required for simulation to be available at 
relatively modest prices. 
The simulation technique, due to its generic nature, 
can offer some useful features appropriate to mechani- 
cal systems. The first is the ability to model any form of 
distribution for failure and repair times. As outlined 
above, it is possible to accommodate this requirement 
within the fault tree analysis technique. However, as far 
as the authors are aware, none of the available com- 
mercial codes features this capability. 
Maintenance activity has a very important influence 
on the reliability of mechanical systems. Simulation can 
model scheduled maintenance outages, maintenance 
activity prioritization and queuing of repair jobs. Over 
the coming years it is highly likely that this technique 
will provide the most appropriate means of analysis for 
mechanical systems. 
7 FACTORS AFFECTING MECHANICAL SYSTEM 
ASSESSMENTS 
The steps in the reliability assessment of a plant or 
system are summarized in Section 4. More details of 
these steps are given in references (9) and (II), which 
also provide example case studies of their application in 
availability assessments. As noted in these case studies 
and reiterated in this paper, a major cause of uncer- 
tainty in the prediction of mechanical system avail- 
ability is data. Failure rate data for large, complex items 
of mechanical plant are a particular problem because of 
uncertainties concerning the boundaries and the 
operating/environmental conditions of the items from 
which the generic failure rates were derived. Mean 
outage times (repair and waiting times), which are 
necessary to predict item availability, can also pose 
problems since they depend on the equipment design 
and the variety of conditions peculiar to each plant. 
These include the operations and maintenance policy, 
availability of spares, access for maintenance and many 
other factors. 
Maintainability analysis is essential for mechanical 
system assessments and unfortunately is an area largely 
ignored by reliability specialists. Some useful research 
has been carried out in one or two limited areas, for 
example the subjective analysis by Thompson (12) of 
pipe couplings. The OREDA (Ofshore Reliability Data) 
Handbook (13) includes estimates of repair times in 
addition to failure rates for quite a wide range of 
mechanical equipment, and since this is a very specific 
functional environment associated with clear definitions 
of system boundaries the data may be employed in 
global assessments with some degree of confidence. 
The basic requirement is for assurance that the differ- 
ent factors that can affect the reliability performance of 
an equipment in a specified environment have been con- 
sidered and their effect on generic failure and repair 
rates evaluated. The objective should be to identify the 
degradation mechanisms that could apply in each case 
and then to assess the tolerance of the system to such 
mechanisms and the compensating provisions in the 
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Fig. 8 Analysis of predicted plant outages 
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design that could mitigate their effects. For example, the 
principal degradation mechanisms likely to influence 
reliability performance of a large, continuously operated 
gas turbine driving a high-speed centrifugal hydrocar- 
that will need particular attention by maintenance engi- 
neers during the plant lifetime. 
8 CONCLUSIONS 
bon gas compressor in an offshore environment are 
fatigue and wear. Attention to oil analysis and vibration 
monitoring during operation should ensure that appro- 
priate maintenance action is taken before a major 
failure can develop. With this provision the random- 
shock (constant hazard-rate) model could be appropri- 
ate. 
Reliability performance could be significantly differ- 
ent for a similar gas turbine driven HC gas compressor 
operated intermittently in the onshore environment of a 
gas-distribution network. The failure rates, failure 
modes and repair characteristics are likely to be quite 
different in these two environments, requiring a totally 
different approach to maintenance and testing. In this 
case high stresses can be generated due to acceleration 
and temperature transients during start-up. A weakest- 
link model may then be more appropriate since degra- 
dation will be less easily detected. 
The operating regime, environmental conditions and 
maintenance strategy are the factors that need particu- 
lar attention in mechanical system availability assess- 
ments. Failure mode and effect analysis in association 
with fault trees and a subjective analysis of equipment 
maintainability should ensure that the potential high 
outage time failure modes associated with material deg- 
radation are identified at the design stage. Appropriate 
condition monitoring systems should be specified to 
ensure that these potentially high outage time failures 
are revealed before the system deteriorates significantly. 
Maintenance actions can then be planned for the next 
time the plant requires a shut-down. If degradation-type 
failures are anticipated and eliminated before they 
develop, the constant hazard-rate reliability model will 
be appropriate for mechanical systems. Random shocks 
to the system cannot be anticipated so predicted avail- 
abilities at that stage will be the best that can be 
achieved without introducing additional redundancy or 
other design changes. However, the failure tolerance of 
alternative systems can in some cases be significantly 
higher and some loss of process efficiency may be a 
worthwhile price to pay for a system with a higher 
availability potential. 
An example of one output from a major plant avail- 
ability study is shown in Fig. 8. The distribution of 
outage times for this 1000 tonne/day ammonia plant is 
arranged as a matrix showing the predicted downtime 
of the top 10 systems (out of 23) and the contribution 
by the main equipment classes. It is notable that the 
predictions were generally confirmed during the first 
year of operation. Such a matrix clearly shows the areas 
The availability of mechanical equipment can have a 
significant impact on plant profitability; hence avail- 
ability assessment of new installations should be an 
essential part of the design process. 
Standard methods for equipment reliability assess- 
ment, such as failure mode and effect analysis and fault 
trees, can be effective if precautions are taken to ensure 
that likely degradation mechanisms are identified and 
measures introduced (such as condition monitoring) to 
minimize their contribution to plant downtime. Alterna- 
tive techniques such as Monte Carlo simulation may 
become more popular for this aspect over the next few 
years. 
The operating and maintenance regimes can have a 
very significant influence on mechanical plant avail- 
ability. Unless precautions are taken to anticipate the 
onset of mechanical equipment degradation major fail- 
ures associated with long outage times are likely to 
occur from time to time. Where degradation effects 
cannot be monitored and controlled the constant 
hazard rate model is not an adequate representation of 
likely reliability performance. 
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